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Civil Code § 48.8 (new).
AB 1717 (Zettel); 2001 STAT. Ch. 570.
1. INTRODUCTION
Not long after the 1999 Columbine School incident,' Kristina Tapia, a former
Quartz Hill High School student, overheard a male classmate saying, "We're sick
of people. We want to kill them."' Tapia reported what she overheard to school
administrators.' The police later charged Tapia's classmate with making a
terrorist threat. After pleading guilty to the charges, the classmate received six
months probation. Later, as a result of Tapia's report to school officials, the male
student and his parents sued Tapia and her parents for slander and invasion of
privacy.6 Since the student actually made the threats and current California law
shields speech in the public interest, the judge dismissed the suit, but not before
Tapia and her parents incurred forty thousand dollars in legal fees.7
1. See generally Lisa M. Pisciotta, Comment, Beyond Sticks & Stones: A First Amendment Framework
for Educators Who Seek to Punish Student Threats, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 635 (2000) (reporting that in April
1999, two high school students armed with guns walked into Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado,
killing twelve fellow students and one teacher).
2. ASSEMBLY COMMrIt'EE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1717, at 3 (May 8, 2001);
Robert DeKoven, Gun Shy: Lawsuits Deter Students, Parents From Reporting School Violence, L.A. DAILY J.,
Feb. 28, 2001, at 6, available at http://www.cwsl.edu/faculty/rdekoven/GunShy.html (last visited June 1, 2001)
(copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see Jim Sanders, Student's Good Deed Brings Woe,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 13, 2001, at Al (reporting that the student who made these threats was arrested and
pled guilty to charges of making terrorist threats).
3. ASSEMBLY COMMrfrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMIT'EE ANALYSIS OF AB 1717, at 3 (May 8, 2001);
DeKoven, supra note 2; Sanders, supra note 2.
4. See Massie Ritsch, District Sued Over Student Informant's Legal Fees, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2001, at
B I (noting that the boy was additionally charged with intimidating a witness after he threatened Tapia for
reporting his violent threat to school officials).
5. DeKoven, supra note 2.
6. Id.
7. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 43 (West 1982 & Supp. 2002) (addressing general personal rights to protection
from defamation and circumstances where no cause of action will arise); DeKoven, supra note 2.
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In 2001, Al DeGuzman, a freshman at De Anza Community College dropped
off some film at a local drugstore to be developed.8 Kelly Bennett, a student at
San Jose State University and an employee of the photo lab, developed photos of
DeGuzman surrounded by explosives and other weapons.9 She alerted the
authorities, who later credited her with stopping a violent attack on the De Anza
campus planned for the following day.' ° The police arrested the young man while
he attempted to retrieve his photos from the drugstore photo lab." Following his
arrest, he pled not guilty to 116 felony counts of possession of explosives and
firearms. 2 Subsequently, the young man's family threatened Bennett with a civil
suit for defamation of character. 3 Student tipsters, like Bennett, may risk paying
a high price for doing the right thing.
4
These troublesome examples demonstrate the often unknown risk of civil
suits brought against parties who report threats of school violence. In the current
climate of school violence, student informants and their families deserve as much
protection as possible. 6 In fact, the incidents at Columbine 7 and Santana 8 High
Schools have prompted communities and legislatures nationwide to encourage
students to report potential threats in order to prevent future tragedies. '9
Unfortunately, subsequent civil litigation may penalize those who alert
authorities of potential school violence involving the use of a firearm or other
8. Photo Clerk Says California Bombing Suspect was "Weird," CNN.com (Jan. 31, 2001), available at
http://www.cnn.com/200IUS/01/31/college.bombs/ [hereinafter Photo Clerk] (copy on file with the McGeorge
Law Review); Vicki Haddock & Stacy Finz, The High Price of Silence: Educators, Officials Reinforce
Importance of Sounding Alarms, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 7, 2001, at A1.
9. See Photo Clerk, supra note 8 (stating that police later found evidence that Al DeGuzman, a freshman
at De Anza, had been planning a violent attack on his college campus); Haddock & Finz, supra note 8, at Al.
10. Photo Clerk, supra note 8.
11. id.
12. Id.; see also Matthew B. Stannard, De Anza Plotter Guilty of 108 Counts, Former Student May Face
100 Years for Planning Rampage, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 27, 2002, at Al (reporting that Al DeGuzman was
recently found guilty of 108 felony counts).
13. George Runner, Encourage Kids to Report School Violence, California State Assembly Republican
Caucus, at http://republican.assembly.ca.gov/members/36/Editorial874.html (last visited June 1, 2001) (copy on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Press Release, California State Assembly Republican Caucus, School Tipster Immunity Bill
Passes Floor 71-0 (Mar. 17, 2001) [hereinafter Assembly Press Release] (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (presenting the views of Assemblymember Zettel).
17. Pisciotta, supra note 1, at 635; see V. Dion Haynes, Schools Confront Threats, Bullying: Lawmaker
Seeks to Shield Students Who Speak Up, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 12, 2001, at NI (noting that "no one reported the two
[students'] threats of revenge against [those] who teased and bullied them").
18. See generally Chris Moran, Keeping Secrets Turning Deadly, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 8,
2001, at AI (reporting that on the morning of March 5, 2001, Charles "Andy" Williams came to school with a
gun, killing two and wounding thirteen others before he was apprehended). Later, it was discovered that at least
twenty other students heard Williams make threats. These threats went unreported. Id.
19. Memorandum from the Civil Justice Association of California, to the Members of the Assembly
Judiciary Committee (Apr. 25, 2001) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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dangerous weapons. 20 Laws that allow people who make threats to file a
defamation suit punish and perhaps deter those who have chosen to come
forward with information about potentially violent attacks.2
In response to the recent increase in school violence, studies on past
tragedies, like that which occurred at Columbine High School, demonstrate that
student informants can prevent future incidents of school violence. 22 The U.S.
Secret Service reports that, "in more than three-fourths of school violence cases,
the attackers revealed their plans to at least one fellow student." 23 While students
are already reluctant to "snitch" on each other, possible civil litigation further
complicates the dilemma of reporting threats.24 Chapter 570 shields individuals
who report threats of potential violence involving the use of a firearm or other
21dangerous weapon from civil litigation.
This Legislative Note describes the legal background of Chapter 570,26
including its similarities to California child abuse reporting laws, the potential
problems involved in encouraging students to report threats to school officials,28
and the importance of protecting student informants from civil liability for
defamation in the pursuit of safer schools.29
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Defamation Law
The tort of defamation arises from intentional harm to an individual's
reputation, and includes both libel and slander.0 Defamation law focuses on the
20. See generally id. (urging legislators to vote aye on AB 1717 because it would encourage students to
report threats of violence).
21. Id.
22. See Massie Ritsch, Girl Supports Bill That Would Protect Tipsters, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2001, at B2
(noting that students themselves often have information regarding the potential for school violence).
23. Ritsch, supra note 22, at B2; ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
1717, at 3-4 (May 8, 2001).
24. Law Needs Repair: Protect Campus Informants from Lawsuits, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 19,
2001, at B6 [hereinafter Law Needs Repair].
25. 2001 Cal. Stat. Ch. 570, at 94 (enacting CAL. CIV. CODE § 48.8); see Charles Feldman, Reporting
Possible Threat Leads to Legal Woes for One Child, CNN.com, (Mar. 26, 2001), at http://www. cnn.com/2001/
fyi/teachers.ednews/03/26/school.whistleblowerl (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (referencing a
student tipster immunity bill, now known as Chapter 570).
26. See infra Part II (addressing relevant defamation law and California statutory protections).
27. See infra Part U1.B (pointing out the similarities between Chapter 570 and the California Child Abuse
and Neglect Reporting Act).
28. See infra Part IV (analyzing potential problems surrounding student tipsters).
29. See infra Part V (recognizing the need for laws protecting student tipsters and their role in the
prevention of school violence involving the use of firearms and other dangerous weapons).
30. B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 471 (9th ed. Supp. 1999); see generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558, 559 (1977) (defining defamatory communication); CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 44-46 (West 1982 & Supp. 2002) (defining libel and slander).
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identity of the plaintiff and the nature of the statement.' Civil liability for
defamation exists where there is "[a] false and defamatory statement concerning
another; an unprivileged publication to a third party; fault amounting at least to
negligence on the part of the publisher; and either actionability of the statement
irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the
publication. 32
Chapter 570 focuses on private individuals speaking about matters of public
concern." Under the law, speech satisfying the definition of "public concern"
includes threatening speech, such as threats of violence or the potential for
34physical harm. When speech is of legitimate public concern but the plaintiff is a
private individual, the constitutional requirements are less strict than when the
plaintiff is a public figure and the speech is of public concern. 5 Courts resolve
any questions involving the status of the individual by looking at the individual's
involvement in the particular controversy at issue. 6 When students and other
private individuals who report threats become targets for defamation actions, the
plaintiff must prove by "clear and convincing" evidence that the defendant's
statements were knowingly false or made with reckless disregard for the truth.37
31. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); Brown v. Kelly Broad. Co., 48 Cal. 3d 711,
722, 257 Cal. Rptr. 708, 713-14 (1989).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977); see generally JOHN M. DINSE ET AL.,
CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL: BOOK OF APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS §§ 7.00-.08 (8th ed. 2001)
(providing additional definitions and instructions on the intentional tort of defamation).
33. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1717, at 4-5 (May 8,
2001) (explaining that since most individuals reporting under this law are private individuals, the authors
narrowed the scope of existing defamation law for their analytical purposes); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 351-52 (1947) (stating that private individuals are those who are not public officials, public figures, or
others who are prominent in the community); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 44-46; see generally SENATE COMMITTEE ON
JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1717, at 6-7 (Aug. 21, 2001) (asserting that speech on matters of
public concern "likely includes student reports to school officials of potential gun violence on school grounds").
34. See WITKIN, supra note 30, § 496(b) (stating that speech related to matters of public concern is
determined by content, form, and context); see generally Pisciotta, supra note 1, at 647 (indicating that
ultimately the courts would have to decide whether the statements were in fact threatening or not).
35. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-43 (holding that states may define an appropriate standard of defamation
liability with regard to private individuals; this is less strict than the New York Times standard applying to public
figures in that recovery for defamation is only allowed with- clear and convincing proof that the statement was
made with "knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth"); see WITKIN, supra note 30,
§ 526A (noting that unlike the New York Times standard for public figures, a privilege granted for public
interest purposes is not required under the Constitution).
36. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52 (pointing to the individual's general fame or notoriety in the
community); Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 722, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 713-14. But cf Lundquist v. Reusser, 7 Cal. 4th 1193,
1213, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 776, 788-89 (1994) (showing the distinction between public and private persons,
specifically nonmedia defendants).
37. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1717, at 3 (Aug. 21, 2001)
(discussing existing defamation law and its impact on student informants); CAL. ED. CODE § 48902(d) (West
1993 & Supp. 2002) (granting protection to school principals, their designees, or any other person reporting a
known or suspected dangerous act); see generally New York Times, 376 U.S. at 278-79 (limiting the reach of
state defamation laws by holding that First Amendment protections of free speech limit defamation liability
depending on the status of the individuals involved).
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The common law provides defenses of truth or privilege to individuals facing
defamation lawsuits.38 One who makes a defamatory statement of fact is not
liable for defamation if the statement is true.39 The falsity element is essential to
properly allege an actionable claim for defamation. 40 The law recognizes that
private individuals are more vulnerable to injury; therefore, there is a greater• • * 41
state interest involved in their protection.
In addition to the common law, California has developed a number of
statutory provisions governing state law actions for defamation of character.42
Section 47(c) of the California Civil Code provides a common interest privilege
for communications between interested parties.43 Once a defendant establishes
that this common interest privilege protects their report, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to prove the defendant acted with malice."
Even with this privilege, under existing California law, students and their
parents may incur liability for intentional misconduct, such as making slanderous
statements to others, false light, disclosing private facts, or intentional infliction
of emotional distress.45 Unfortunately, school districts do not help students and
their families defend against these types of lawsuits. 6 Fear of high legal fees and
costs associated with litigation may cause parents to instruct their children not to
38. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 581A, 583-612 (1977) (discussing various
classes of plaintiffs and defendants in relationship to the statement in question).
39. Id.at§581A.
40. Id. at §§ 558(a), 581A.
41. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-46; Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 722-23, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 713-14.
42. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 45-46 (West 1982 & Supp. 2002) (distinguishing libel and slander and
detailing what circumstances constitute a cause of action for defamation).
43. See id. § 47(c) (extending this privilege to situations when the communication is made:
without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by
one who stands in such a relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground
for supposing the motive for the communication to be innocent, or (3) who is requested
by the person interested to give the information.).
44. See Lundquist v. Reusser, 7 Cal. 4th 1193, 1196, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 776, 776-77 (1994) (noting that
under section 47(c) of the California Civil Code, codifying the "common interest" privilege, plaintiff has the
burden of proving that the statement was made with malice).
45. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 46 (defining slander as
a false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered, and also communications by radio or
any mechanical or other means which: (1) charges any person with crime, or with having
been indicted, convicted, or punished for crime; (2) imputes in him the present existence
of an infectious, contagious, or loathsome disease; (3) tends directly to injure him in
respect to his office, profession, trade or business, either by imputing to him general
disqualification in those respects which the office or other occupation peculiarly requires,
or by imputing something with reference to his office, profession, trade, or business that
has a natural tendency to lessen its profits; (4) imputes to him impotence or a want of
chastity; (5) or which, by natural consequence, causes actual damage.);
DeKoven, supra note 2; see generally WITKIN, supra note 30, § 471 (suggesting that certain statements, such as
the charge of a serious crime, are usually held to be defamatory in the minds of everyone).
46. See, e.g., DeKoven, supra note 2 (stating that Antelope Valley High School has thus far refused to
assist the Tapia family with legal fees and costs).
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report threats of future violence.47 The result would be a chilling effect adverse to
the interests of school safety.48
B. The California Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act and Statutory
Protection Against Subsequent Defamdtion Litigation
California's Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act grants substantial
immunity to both mandated and voluntary reporters who convey' information
about child abuse to the proper authorities. 4' The statute specifically protects
"mandated reporters" from liability for negligent, reckless, or even intentionally
false reports regarding alleged child abuse.50 Those who voluntarily report
alleged child abuse receive only limited immunities.5' In California, mandated
reporters have the benefit of absolute immunity, assuring summary judgment in
civil suits and possibly deterring the filing of suits in the first place." However,
those who report child abuse voluntarily are held to a good faith standard and are
liable only when their reports are intentionally false.53 By imposing this limitation
47. See id. (calling for legislative action before retaliatory lawsuits become more common and cause
parents to react in fear of potential liability); see also supra Part I (describing one instance in which a student
incurred forty thousand dollars in legal fees due to a defamation suit following a report of potential violence).
48. DeKoven, supra note 2.
49. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11164-11172.3 (West 2000 & Supp. 2002); see Newton v. County of Napa,
217 Cal. App. 3d 1551, 1558, 266 Cal. Rptr. 682, 685 (1990) (interpreting the statutory language of section
11172 of the Penal Code to extend immunity only to individuals who make reports); see also Caroline Trost,
Chilling Child Abuse Reporting: Rethinking the CAPTA Amendments, 51 VAND. L. REV. 183, 200 (1998)
(identifying that under California law, child care custodians, health practitioners, employees of Child Protective
Services agencies, and commercial film and photographic print processors are mandated reporters and therefore
have absolute immunity; all other individuals are voluntary reporters who are accorded good faith immunity).
50. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11,172(a); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166(a) (defining a mandated reporter as
one who, "in his or her professional capacity or within the scope of his or her employment, has knowledge of or
observes a child whom the professional knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of child abuse or
neglect"); Thomas v. Chadwick, 224 Cal. App. 3d 813, 820, 274 Cal. Rptr. 128, 133-34 (1990) (noting that the
plain language of the statute limits ,the immunity granted to voluntary reporters if those reports are knowingly
false or made with reckless disregard for truth or falsity); see also Storch v. Silverman, 186 Cal. App. 3d 671,
678, 231 Cal. Rptr. 27, 31 (1986) (discussing the different kinds of immunity granted to mandatory and
voluntary reporters).
51. Chadwick, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 133-34; Storch, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 678, 231
Cal. Rptr. at 31.
52. See Trost, supra note 49, at 200 (explaining that although mandatory reporters must show
"reasonable cause" for their report of child abuse, they receive absolute immunity rather than good faith
immunity against civil suits).
53. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 48.7 (West 1982 & Supp. 2002) (protecting reporters from liability when
providing any statements "which are reasonably believed to be in furtherance of the prosecution of the criminal
charges"); Trost, supra note 49, at 200; see Storch, 186 Cal. App. 3d at 680, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 32 (stating that
the extension of limited immunity to voluntary reporters will encourage reports while preventing individuals
from making knowingly false reports); see generally Lundquist v. Reusser, 7 Cal. 4th 1193, 1206, 31 Cal. Rptr.
2d 776, 783-84 (1994) (establishing that communications, which are made in good faith, concerning a subject in
which the speaker and hearer share a common interest, are generally protected). The requirement of good faith
distinguishes a qualified privilege from an absolute privilege. Id.; 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 278
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on voluntary reporter immunity, the Legislature attempted to reduce the number
of inaccurate or false reports .
Additionally, section 48.7 of the California Civil Code protects individuals
who report incidents of child abuse and suspected child abuse from retaliatory
defamation suits.55 Specifically, this section prohibits victims of child abuse or
their parents from bringing defamation suits against individuals who report
56suspected abuse. In civil suits stemming from child abuse reports, courts have
focused on the language of the statute as well as the Legislature's intent to
protect reporters who come forward with information.57 These courts have
concluded that the Legislature's goal of encouraging individuals to report child
abuse would be nullified if those making the reports faced expensive civil
litigation.
III. CHAPTER 570
Chapter 570 provides that a communication "stating that a specific student or
other specified person has made a threat to commit violence or potential violence
on the school grounds involving the use of a firearm or other deadly or dangerous
weapon" is a communication on a matter of public concern.59 Under Chapter 570,
a student who reports this information in good faith is immune from civil liability
for defamation. 60 This good faith standard is satisfied as long as the individual
"reasonably believes" that the report is correct.6' Individuals who report potential
(2000) (stating that good faith requires that the speaker "reasonably believe" that the statement is correct).
54. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48.7; CAL. PENAL CODE §11172; see Diana Kerckhoff Marsh, Over-Extension of
hnmunity in the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act, 26 BEVERLY HILLS B.J. 9, 17 (1992) (noting cases
such as Thomas v. Chadwick and Storch v. Silverman indicating that granting limited immunity may prevent an
increase in false reports of abuse).
55. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 48.7(a) (stating specifically:
No person charged by indictment, information, or other accusatory pleading of child
abuse may bring a civil libel or slander action against the minor, the parent or guardian of
the minor, or any witness, based upon any statements made by the minor, parent or
guardian, or witness which are reasonably believed to be in furtherance of the prosecution
of the criminal charges while the charges are pending before a trial court.).
56. Id.
57. Trost, supra note 49, at 197-98.
58. See id. at 198 (citing Maples v. Siddiqui, 450 N.W.2d 529, 530-31 (Iowa 1990) and D.L.C. v. Walsh,
908 S.W.2d 791, 798-99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) to illustrate that the purpose of the reporting law is to protect
reporters from expensive civil litigation arising in response to their actions).
59. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48.8 (enacted by Chapter 570).
60. Id.; Ritsch, supra note 22, at B2; see ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITEE ANALYSIS
OF AB 1717, at I (May 8, 2001) (declaring that Chapter 570 applies to all public, private and postsecondary
educational institutions); see generally 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 293 (2000) (recognizing that with
regard to communications in aid of law enforcement, voluntary statements made by private individuals are
presumed to be protected by a qualified privilege).
61. Lundquist v. Reusser, 7 Cal. 4th 1193, 1206, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 776, 783-84; Runner, supra note 13;
50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 278 (stating that good faith requires that the speaker must "reasonably
believe" that the statement is correct).
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instances of violence may be liable if they make a report "with knowledge of its
falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the communication. 62
By including this language in the statute, the Legislature sought to avoid the
problem of an increase in false reports.
Chapter 570 encourages those individuals with information about
potential school violence involving the use of a firearm or other dangerous
weapon to report what they know to the proper authorities." Under Chapter 570,
most defamation claims against students who report in good faith will eventually
lead to dismissal.64
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW LAW
A. Voluntary Informants, Immunity, and Good Faith Reporting
When Kristina Tapia came forward with information about potential school
violence, she was following the recommendations of school officials to prevent a
school tragedy. 6' By enacting Chapter 570, the Legislature is attempting to keep
voluntary student informants, like Tapia, from having to defend themselves in a
defamation lawsuit.
66
Since Chapter 570 is one of the first laws protecting students who report
threats of potential violence from defamation liability, its authors compare it to
existing child abuse reporting laws.67 Chapter 570 extends immunity to students
similar to that extended to voluntary child abuse reporters under the Child Abuse
and Neglect Reporting Act.65 Students are only subject to liability if they make
62. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48.8(a) (enacted by Chapter 570); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11172 (West 2000 &
Supp. 2002); Marsh, supra note 54, at 17.
63. See Assembly Press Release, supra note 16 (stressing the importance of reporting by students and
parents who have knowledge of even the smallest chance of potential harm to others).
64. See Ritsch, supra note 22, at B2 (reporting that students, parents, and school officials would be
protected from liability for reporting "reasonably foreseeable" harm under Chapter 570).
65. See Sanders, supra note 2, at Al (noting that Tapia's report was made one week after the Columbine
incident when school officials all across the nation were advising students to keep their schools safe by
reporting any potential threats).
66. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1717, at 1 (May 8, 2001);
Runner, supra note 13.
67. See Runner, supra note 13 (comparing the new law to Penal Code section 11172(a), which provides
that "any person who makes a report of child abuse known to be false or with reckless disregard of the truth or
falsity of the report is liable for any damages caused"); see also DeKoven, supra note 2 (stressing the need for
legislation protecting student informants that is similar to the protection afforded those who report child abuse).
68. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11164-11172.3 (West 2000 & Supp. 2002); see also supra Part II.B
(discussing immunity from civil liability provided for individuals who voluntarily report incidents of abuse or
suspected abuse); see ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1717, at 2 (May 8,
2001) (explaining that Chapter 570 protects a student who, in good faith, reports to the proper authorities any
information regarding the potential for physical harm); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 11172 (providing
immunity from criminal and civil liability to an individual who has made a good faith report of abuse or
suspected abuse of a child); DeKoven, supra note 2 (advocating the position that students who report
"reasonably foreseeable" potential for violence should be protected from civil liability).
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statements that are knowingly false or that are made with reckless disregard for
the truth.6 9 By limiting a student's liability for defamation, the Legislature is
granting immunity to student informants who reasonably believe that a potential
for violence exists and who diligently report it.7° The statutory language of the
child abuse reporter immunity law differs from Chapter 570, but the Legislature
71intends that the standard be the same.
A potential drawback to providing immunity under a good faith standard is
the possibility of increased false claims." School officials and law enforcement
will be left with the tasks of determining whether the reports were made in good
faith and taking appropriate disciplinary actions if they were not. 3 Under Chapter
570, clear and convincing evidence that the student or other individual reported a
threat with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth or
falsity of the communication would be required.74 An individual who makes a
false report is not immune from suit; this effectively creates a disincentive to lie.75
B. Immunity Provisions: Are They Effective?
Fear of retaliation or possible legal action often prevents an individual from
76making a legitimate report. Legislators develop immunity provisions to
encourage reports of violence or abuse and to calm the fears of those making the
reports.77 Immunity provisions, such as Chapter 570, have traditionally been
included in reporting statutes to publicize the fact that the law protects reporters
from civil liability. 78 Although statutory and other common law safeguards
already exist to protect potential reporters, the inclusion of an immunity
69. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11164-11172.3; supra Part lI.B; ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1717, at 2 (May 8, 2001); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11172; see DeKoven, supra note
2 (noting that students should not be liable for false reports when "school officials can deal with [them] through
administrative procedures").
70. See Runner, supra note 13 (quoting co-author, Assemblyman George Runner, as stating that "AB
1717 grants school officials immunity from civil lawsuits when, in good faith, they report the threat of violence
at school."). Assemblymember Runner further states that this law would protect informants similar to the
current law protecting child abuse reporters. Id.
71. See id. (emphasizing that the same standard used for child abuse reporters would apply to student
tipsters).
72. See id. (discussing whether grants of immunity from liability would invite false claims or permit
students to misinform authorities by reporting false threats).
73. Id.
74. CAL. CIV. CODE § 48.8 (enacted by Chapter 570).
75. Runner, supra note 13.
76. L. Lee Dowding, Comment, Immunity Under the California Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act:
Is Absolute Immunity the Answer?, 26 CAL. W. L. REV. 373, 382 (1990).
77. See id. (explaining that reporters often refrain from making reports for fear of legal frustrations,
including not only liability, but also time, money, and other inconveniences resulting from involvement in a
lawsuit).
78. See id. at 382, 384-85 (discussing the immunity provision found in section 11172(a) of the Penal
Code, California's Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act).
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provision with the express language of the statute assures complete protection
from liability.'9 This specific immunity provision furthers the goal of encouraging
students to report potential threats of violence.0
Unlike California's child abuse reporting laws, which include a
reimbursement provision for attorney's fees and costs, whether Chapter 570 truly
protects student informants from the costs of litigation remains unclear.8' The
new law will ensure quick dismissal of retaliatory lawsuits, but without a
reimbursement provision, students and their parents will continue to incur
litigation costs until the actions are dismissed. Kristina Tapia and her family
filed suit against the School District, Los Angeles County, and the Office of
Education, seeking reimbursement for their legal expenses.83 Since the County or
School District did not employ Tapia at the time of her report, California law did
not provide her with indemnification.8 The School District refused to reimburse
the Tapias because the reimbursement of legal fees would be a gift of public
funds, which is prohibited under California law.85 Supporters of the law suggest
that California law supports the argument that the "public purpose promoted by
schools defending student whistle blowers" does not amount to a gift of public
funds to a private party.8 6 However, without a reimbursement provision
specifically stated within the law, a student reporter will most likely incur some
legal expenses responding to a civil suit.
87
79. See id. at 382, 387 (explaining that, in most cases, potential reporters are unaware of laws protecting
them from liability, and their ability to read the actual grant of immunity within the statute helps encourage
reports); Monrad G. Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Legislation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
34 (1967) (explaining that the common law protects reporters from retaliatory suits they may face as a results of
their actions, such as invasion of privacy, malicious prosecution, libel or slander). As long as the report is in
good faith, mandated and voluntary reporters receive protection under the common law. Id.
80. See Dowding, supra note 76, at 382 (explaining that the purpose of immunity provisions is not only
to provide immunity, but also to publicize those protections afforded to reporters, discourage retaliatory
litigation, and encourage reporters to come forward with information).
81. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1172(c) (West 2000 & Supp. 2002) (providing mandated reporters with
reimbursement by the State for attorney's fees incurred in defending action resulting from their report);
DeKoven, supra note 2 (stating that the costs of defending a civil suit, whether five thousand dollars or five
million dollars, can be substantial, and they are not recoverable from the losing side even if the suit is
dismissed).
82. DeKoven, supra note 2.
83. See Sanders, supra note 2, at Al (reporting that the court dismissed the Tapias' attempt to recover
legal expenses).
84. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48902 (West 1993 & Supp. 2002) (detailing the immunity provided to
school employees); Ritsch, supra note 22, at B2 (reporting that the Tapias' failed to receive aid from the school
district with legal expenses related to defense of the defamation suit).
85. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1717, at 5-6 (Aug. 21, 2001)
(discussing a possible solution to the problems of reimbursing student reporters for their legal expenses in civil
suits stemming from their reports); CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 6 (addressing the prohibition on gifts of public
funds).
86. SENATE COMMIrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1717, at5-6 (Aug. 21, 2001).
87. Id.
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As students become more aware of the importance of reporting threats of
school violence, lawsuits against reporters may only increase in number.8  The
Legislature enacted Chapter 570 to address the increasing number of these suits."
Chapter 570 not only works to prevent future school violence by encouraging
reporting but also affords student informants and their families some level of
protection from civil litigation.90
V. CONCLUSION
Across the Nation, schools work to discourage bullying and teasing, which
are believed to be two of the main causes of threats of violence or retaliation.9'
Legislators and educators are working toward establishing systems for reporting
and investigating student harassment and intimidation within the Nation's
schools.92 As violence threatens an increasing number of campuses, Chapter 570
acts as a tool to advance the prevention of such violence by protecting students
who take the difficult step of coming forward with information. 9 For students,
approaching adults with sensitive information is often difficult to do, especially if
the information involves "snitching" on a friend or peer.94 The recent
development of zero-tolerance policies and the potential for civil suits make the
decision to come forward with information about this violence even more
difficult.9 Zero-tolerance policies and other strict school rules will punish
students for misconduct but may also discourage students from reporting threats
if they are not sure of the validity of the threat.96
Because of the recent school shootings across the Nation, students are
generally more afraid.97 Concern over potential tragedy in their own school
increasingly outweighs the fear of being a "tattletale" or "snitch." 98 Student
88. Ritsch, supra note 22, at B2.
89. Id.
90. Id.; Runner, supra note 13; ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB
1717, at 3-4 (May 8, 2001).
91. Haynes, sypra note 17, at Ni.
92. Id.
93. See ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1717, at 3-4 (May 8,
2001) (stating the author's concerns over the recent violent tragedies in schools across the nation and their goal
to provide protection to student informants and their families by the introduction of AB 1717).
94. See Moran, supra note 18, at Al (reporting that after the Columbine tragedy, students expressed
concerns over the consequences of reporting, such as zero-tolerance policies, involving the student's immediate
suspension or expulsion from the school for their actions).
95. See id. (reporting that the recent development of zero-tolerance policies may conflict with
encouraging students to report violence).
96. See id. (questioning whether new school policies developed to curb school violence are consistent
with the goal of encouraging reporting of potential violence).
97. See id. (discussing that in the aftermath of recent school tragedies, students are more aware of the
potential for school violence).
98. Id.
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tipsters, like Kristina Tapia, deserve greater protection from the law. 99 Students
need to realize that reporting threats of potential school violence is appropriate.' 3
Chapter 570 takes the difficult decision of determining the validity of a
potential threat out of the hands of the student by ensuring their protection from
defamation liability.' °' The passage of Chapter 570 represents the Legislature's
decision to promote safety in schools by providing reporting students and their
families the immunity they deserve.'0 2
99. See ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMrITEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1717, at 3-4 (May 8,
2001) (asserting that student tipsters and their families should be given as much protection as possible).
100. Id.
101. Id.; see also supra Part IV.A (explaining that Chapter 570 shifts the burden of determining the
validity of the threat to school officials).
102. ASSEMBLY COMMrIEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMII'rEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1717, at 3-4 (May 8, 2001);
Runner, supra note 13.
